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THE RACKET-CONTROL LAWS OF VIRGINIA:
A REVIEW
WILLIAM A. REDFERN, JR.* AND LUTHER'W. WHITE, III*
The publicity resulting from the Kefauver Committee's investi-
gation of interstate crime' has thrown a spot light on local law enforce-
ment, particularly in the "racket" group. Too often, the Kefauver
Committee reports, lax law enforcement on the local level has enabled
an underworld to build its strength until a city or county is unable to
shake its hold. The Committee further points out that with alert, honest
enforcement, there are sufficient existing statutes already on State and
local books to cope with most forms of underworld business organiza-
tions, commonly termed "rackets." In Virginia and most Southern
States there are generally three major areas in which there are under-
world business organizations; namely, prostitution, alcoholic beverages
and gambling. Although urban areas have more concern with these
three "rackets," they are not unknown in rural communities.
2
Although each major "racket" can be considered separately, one
should always remember that such enterprises are intertwined with one
another and, frequently, while a law breaker may escape conviction
and punishment in his major field, he may be less fortunate in a minor
one.3 Effective law enforcement depends on knowledge and use of
*Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, City of Norfolk, Va.
'Kefauver, "Crime in the United States," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 33,
April 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1951. This Committee's full title is 'Special Committee to
Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce." Its report and records of hearings are
available at the 'Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
-Illegal whiskey, for example, is manufactured in the rural areas, but the market
is in the cities; law enforcement officials necessarily therefore must use different sec-
tions of the A.B.C. Act of Virginia in coping with the type of problem presented.
'The classic example is mobster Al Capone's conviction for income tax evasion
while never being charged with murder and extortion. Similarly, known whiskey
runners have been convicted for violating the Motor Vehicle Act, speeding, driving
after license revoked, etc., and notorious prostitutes convicted of violations regard-
ing whiskey, a necessary adjunct to that business.
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existing laws and, of course, on factual situations. It is the purpose
of this article to examine separately the three above-listed areas of so-
called petty crime and to set out the tbols in Virginia, in the form of
laws and technique, for fighting these rackets, as well as to set out and to
evaluate interpretative decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals which have strengthened (or weakened) these tools. Effective
racket control, it should be noted, is predicated on the theory that all
laws are strictly administered by honest law enforcement officials.
Further, it should not be assumed that the business of prostitution,
illegal whiskey traffic, and gambling will ever be entirely eradicated;
rather, such rackets can be contained by harrassment and by removing
the big profit which makes them so attractive. It is with these premises
that the existing laws on prostitution, whiskey and gambling will be
considered.
Some of the findings and recommendations of the Kefauver Com-
mittee will be noted, for the purpose of drawing comparisons between
national and state-wide racket-control efforts. The authors have also
interrogated a number of the attorneys for the Commonwealth through-
out the State, in order to be able to present a concensus of opinion as
to the questions which will be discussed herein.
Prostitution
Prostitution, often termed "the World's Oldest Profession," will
generally flourish in direct proportion to law enforcement 4 and, as
in any business, is actually sensitive to demand. Concentration of males
in an area as result of war or development of an industry, usually stim-
ulates business to such an extent that controlling legislation may soon
follow.5 Obvious gaps in the law caused by cultural lags are thus plug-
ged.6
Historically, legislation in Virginia has been aimed at punishing
4See H. Pariser, Health Department Approach to the Venereal Disease Problem
in a Military Area with Particular Reference to the Norfolk Situation, 37 J. Soc.
Hyg., No. 3, May, 1951, which illustrates how the venereal disease rates will drop
when there is a concerted drive by public officials, both civil and military. The "V.
D. rate" is usually a fairly reliable index in a community of existing prostitution.
'For example, see 4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §18-85 to 18-96. All this series
of laws with the exception of § 18-87, were originally passed in two emergency en-
actments by the legislature in 1918 [Acts of Assembly (1918) c. 2 5 6, p. 436 and c. 404, p.
670]. The resulting law has led to confusion, and the need for legislative revision has
been pointed out by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Comm. v. Gaskill,
185 Va. 440, 445, 39 S. E. (2d) 296, 299 (1946).
OSee note 5, supra. Sec. x8-88 covers the problem of the motor vehicle, which,
prior to 1918, was of little importance.
[Vol. IX
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the keeper of a house of prostitution rather than the individual par-
ticipant. While the act of keeping a house of prostitution, or bawdy-
house, was a common law offense and indictable,7 a law was passed in
19488 as a part of the general criminal statute of that Legislature which
read as follows:
"Section 6. Any free person who shall keep a house of ill
fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness,
shall be punished by confinement in jail not more than twelve
months and by fine not exceeding two hundred dollars."
In 1878 the Legislature, in a revision of the criminal code reenacted the
above statute, changing the first sentence to read, "If any person keep a
house," etc., and also added this significant clause at the end: "And in
a prosecution for this offense, the general character of such house may
be proved."9 The value of this clause will be considered further.10
Substantially unchanged since 1878, this law is now incorporated in
a series of statutes, referred to as the Section 18-85 series, at Section
18-87.
The remaining statutes of this series were passed by the State Leg-
islature in 1918.11 The pandering statute' 2 was passed in 191o,13 and
the prostitution nuisance law' 4 was enacted in 1916.' 5 The vagrancy
statutes16 have been on the law books since the very earliest times,17
and in 1936 the law was amended by adding a section making asso-
ciation with prostitutes and persons engaged in the operation of dis-
orderly houses part of the definition of vagrants.'8 With the exception of
statutes on the periphery of prostitution, these are the primary laws on
the subject now existing in Virginia. Although certain statutes have
been in effect for a long period and represent, basically, a codification
of the common law, most of the laws were enacted during the early part
'Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932) §1722. See also Miller v. Comm., 88 Va.
618, 621, 14 S. E. 161, 162 (1892), in which the Court of Appeals subscribes to this
doctrine while passing on a different matter.
'Acts of Assembly (x847-48) c. 12o, Tit, II, §6.
DActs of Assembly (1877-78) c. 3xi, chap. VII §1o.
"OSee notes 32 and 3, infra.
"See note 5, supra.
"4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §18-97. All statute citations hereafter will
refer to Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o), unless otherwise designated.
"Acts of Assembly (191o) c. 163, p. 252.
"Secs. 48-7 to 48-15.
'Acts of Assembly (1916) c. 463, p. 780.
u-Secs. 63-338 to 63-341.
"TRevised Code of Va. (1819) C. 239, §42, P. 276
"Acts of Assembly (1936) c. 136, § 9, P. 255. See Morgan v. Comm., 168 Va. 731,
191 S. E. 791 (1937), upholding this section (although a gambler was the vagrant in
the case) as a constitutional exercise of police power.
1952]
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of the twentieth century. The basic aim of this recent legislation has
been two-fold: control over "commercialized" vice and control over
disease as spread by prostitution-a public health measure as opposed to
a morals law. 19
As tools for control, the existing statutes are generally adequate,
although certain of them might be sharpened. The Section 18-85 series
is primarily designed for prostitution control and therefore should be
examined in that light with other statutes considered as complement-
ary thereto.
The first section, 18-85 deals with and includes the individual
prostitute and the individual act. The language is broad in this section,
which fact has been pointed out by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
20
It makes unlawful any visit by any person to any place "which is used
or is to be used" for prostitution, etc. Thus,, evidence of a visit to any
place, reputable or not, for the purpose of prostitution, is sufficient
for conviction.21 Nor is there any requirement that the act of prosti-
tution be completed; it is only necessary that there be sufficient evidence
that the place was to be used by the accused person for such pur-
pose.22 Where evidence cannot be adduced that money or some
consideration was exchanged (a necessary element of prostitution),
although suspicious behaviour has been observed, then a person could
be charged with adultery and fornication,23 vagrancy,24 or under city
ordinances regulating disorderly and immoral conduct.
The second section, 18-86, covers the person who aids another in
finding a place which is used or is to be used for prostitution.25 This
offense is similar to the pandering statute26 insofar as it strikes at the
procurer, rather than the prostitute, but the quantum of proof is not
as great.2 7 The latter crime is difficult though not impossible to prove
"Secs. 18-9o, 18-93. See generally § 32-go, et seq. See note, supra, for a medical
approach to venereal disease control in a city adjacent to a large military establish-
ment.
2°Dorchincoz v. Comm., 191 Va. 33, 40, 59 S. E. (2d) 863, 866 (1950).
-Drochincoz v. Comm., 191 Va. 33, 59 S. E. (2d) 863 (1950).
22Dorchincoz v. Comm., 191 Va. 33, 59 S. E. (2d) 863 (195o). Such a requirement
permits undercover police work without a "customer" being subject to a possibly
embarrassing cross-examination. Further, it should be noted that in most criminal
offenses, the completed act is necessary to carry the full penalty; a non-completed act,
i.e., an attempt to do an act, would be punishable under the Attempt Statute, §18-8.
Not so under § 18-85.
2§18-32.
21Secs. 63-338 to 63- 341.
"Dorchincoz v. Comm., 191 Va. 33, 40, 59 S. E. (2d) 863, 866 (1950)-
21§18-97.
2'Nor is the penalty, pandering being a felony, and the violation of § 18-86 being
a misdemeanor.
[Vol. IX
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without the testimony of the individual engaging in prostitution,28
whereas slight participation as a procurer is sufficient under the
broad language of Section 18-86. This section is peculiarly well-suited
for the prosecution of the obliging bellhop or beer tavern runner.
The next section, 18-87, is a modern version of the old "house of
ill fame" statute which is substantially set out above. Controversies
over the language in the section have caused much case law in Virginia.
The early statute defined the house as one of "ill fame." This was held
to be synonymous with bawdy-house 29 and the present code section uses
the word "bawdy-house," and has dropped the words "house of ill
fame." A "house of prostitution" has also been declared synonymous
with a "house of ill fame."
3 0
There is no requirement under the decisions in Virginia that the
"house" have more than one room or be inhabited by more than one
person.31 Use of a single room for purposes of prostitution in a house
otherwise reputable is sufficient under the statute.
In order to convict the keeper of the house, it must be proved that
he had knowledge of its illegal use. In that respect, the Court of Ap-
peals has reversed a conviction in which the defendant had recently
purchased the suspect premises, a hotel, and had denied knowledge
of the immoral conduct in it. On the other hand, the Court has sus-
tained a conviction in which the defendant was the night-to-night
manager of a tourist court resorted to for prostitution. Both defend-
ants were found guilty by juries.32 Since the question of guilty know-
ledge is for the jury to determine, it would seem that the Court of Ap-
peals examined each factual situation as it arose, and that neither case
can be considered to state the test to determine guilty knowledge. But
in view of the Court's pronouncement that "in cases of this nature the
rule of common sense should apply,"33 it appears that the evidence in
the two cases from which each jury could infer guilty knowledge was not
2sTo prove tht part of her earnings were received by the aider as the latter's
share in the illegal enterprise.
"Wilson v. Comm., 132 Va. 824, 111 S. E. 96 (1922).
: Trent v. Comm., 181 Va. 338, 341, 25 S. E. (2d) 350 (1943), citing with approval
a California case, People v. Marron, 140 Cal. App. 432, 35 P. (2d) 61o (1934).
-"Trent v. Comm., 181 Va. 338, 341-342, 25 S. E. (2d) 350, 351 (1943).
22Bennett v. Comm., 182 Va. 7, 28 S. E. (2d) 13 (1943); Warsaw v. City of Norfolk,
19o Va. 862, 58 S. E. (2d) 884 (1950). In the Warsaw case a municipal ordinance was
under consideration, but the language of the ordinance is very similar to § 18-87 now
under consideration. The Warsaw case involved a small hotel catering to transient
traffic, and in the Bennett case a tourist camp catering to military personnel was the
place under discussion. In both cases there was evidence of much suspicious activity,
but the apparent knowledge of each accused differed in degree.
3Bennett v. Comm., 182 Va. 7, 12, 28 S. E. (2d) 13, 15 (1943).
195-21
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as different as the two results on appeal. "Juries are supposed to carry
into the jury box ordinary knowledge of men and affairs. Its members
do not cease to be men because they are members."34
Under this section, as previously noted, the general character of
the house may be proved. "General character" has been held to mean
general reputation, and it is not a necessary element of proof when there
is factual evidence available. 35 Clearly, this is a statutory assist to a
prosecution and nothing else, but it seems unlikely that a prosecution
could be based successfully on reputation alone. Recently this question
of general character was again discussed by the Court of Appeals.3 6 A
house had been described by a police officer witness as having the repu-
tation of being a house of prostitution and a bootlegging joint. Al-
though specifically not passing on the point foi: other reasons, the
Court pointed out that the statute does not limit proof of the "general
character" of a house to any specific element. The Court further vol-
unteered that the reputation of being a bootlegging joint is less deroga-
tory than the reputation of being a house of prostitution. It would
seem clear from these comments that all traits of character and repu-
tion are admissible under this section. Logically, it follows that no time
limit should be imposed on such testimony since character and repu-
tation are summaries of opinion from the community at large, nec-
essarily collected over a period of time.
Section 18-88 reaches those individuals who use the automobile and
other modern transportation devices for conducting prostitution. Here
again the language is broad and is designed apparently to require less
evidence than the pandering statute. The taxi-cab driver in league
with the prostitute is the target at which this statute is usually aimed.
The remaining sections in the series, 18-89 to 18-96, concern them-
selves with punishment, venereal disease control and rehabilitation.
Section 18-89 and Section 18-91 are in obvious conflict as to type of
punishment.37 Section 18-89 and Section 18-94 are in conflict as to
quantum of confinement.38 These conflicts have been judicially recog-
3 Foster v. Comm., 179 Va. 96, ioo, i8 S. E. (2d) 314, 316 (1942). Here, defen-
dant's wife was the prostitute and defendant disclaimed knowledge. Defendant's
wardrobe was on the premises and he lived in the adjoining room of his wife. Con-
viction affirmed.
' Wilson v. Comm., 132 Va. 824, Mii S. E. 96 (1922).
"Mitchell v. Comm., 192 Va. 205, 64 S. E. (2d) 713 (1951).
'The former calling for alternative jail or fine, or both, while the latter calls
for a mandatory jail sentence.
The former providing for a sentence up to 12 months in jail, while the latter
provides for an indeterminate sentence of 3 months to 3 years.
[Vol. IX
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nized3 9 and the first-mentioned conflict was resolved by the Supreme
Court of Appeals holding that "in cases of irreconcilable conflict in
statutes passed at the same session of the Legislature, the last one ap-
proved by the Governor must prevail." 40 As it now stands, a jail sen-
tence up to 12 months can be imposed on a keeper of a bawdy-house,
but no fine.41 The Supreme Court of Appeals has called upon the Legis-
lature to clarify the existing confusion with a more precise punishment
section, 42 but at this writing at least two Legislatures have met without
making any changes in these sections. From the point of view of per-
mitting the court the widest discretion in dealing with such cases, per-
haps punishment should be the same as in misdemeanors generally-i.e.,
a fine or imprisonment, or both. However, there is considerable merit
in having a mandatory jail sentence for prostitution and madams be-
cause of its deglamorizing effect.
43
Section 18-9o provides that a person arrested upon a charge of
prostitution or related charge shall be examined for venereal disease
and shall not be admitted to bail until found "not dangerous in the
community on account of such venereal disease...." The same sec-
tion provides for prompt examination, which must begin within three
days after arrest. Clearly intended as a health measure, the incon-
venience and loss of prestige by going to jail for a short time makes the
statute a law enforcer's tool. Disruption of business and unfavorable
publicity caused by arrest and incarceration can have a deterring
effect on a trade where discreetness is a factor of success.
Use of this section, however, presents some problems which are not
just academic. The first is whether or not it applies to the male sex
as well as the female sex. This question has been raised by the Supreme
Court of Appeals but not considered 44 since it was not necessary. Ob-
viously designed for women, Section 18-9o logically could apply to
male keepers as well since, medically, the male is just as likely a
carrier of venereal disease as a female.
A more serious legal and constitutional question could arise under
this section by denying bail prior to completion of the medical exam-
2Gaskill v. Comm., 185 Va. 44o, 39 S. E. (2d) 296 (1946).
"0Gaskill v. Comm., 185 Va. 440, 443, 39 S. E. (2d) 296, 297 (1946).
'1Gaskill v. Comm., 185 Va. 44o, 89 S. E. (2d) 296 (1946); Mitchell v. Comm., 192
Va. 20o5, 64 S. E. (2d) 713 (1951).
'2Gaskill v. Comm., 185 Va. 440, 445, 39 S. E. (2d) 296, 298 (1946).
OBy paying occasional fines and having some of her inmates serve the jail time,
it is perfectly possible for an established madam to conduct business for many years
without ever seeing the inside of a jail.
"Gaskill v. Comm., 185 Va. 44o, 445, 39 S. E. (2d) 296, 298 (1946).
1952]
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ination and/or confining a prostitute or madam pending a medical
examination after she has been acquitted of criminal charges. The
latter is less likely than the former but perfectly possible in a close case.
It would seem that a writ of habeas corpus would be. the method of
testing the constitutionality of the statute which in effect denies a
constitutional right of bail 45 pending trial and any appeal. In prac-
tice, it is unlikely that this section will ever be thus tested, since by
the earliest time the case could be heard, the results of the medical
examination would be known, the question would become moot, and
the Court of Appeals would not likely pass on it.
The pandering statute, Section 18-47, is a long, wordy statute which
makes it a felony, subject to ten years imprisonment, for one to accept
a part of a prostitute's earnings, or to put a woman in a house of
prostitution against her will, etc. There are many variations listed in
this rambling statute, the substance of the law being aimed at the pro-
curer. This section includes a prohibition against transportation of
women in the state for purposes of prostitution and permits any fe-
male, whether married to the defendant or not, to testify. For all
practical purposes, this pandering statute requires the testimony of
a prostitute on behalf of the state. Women generally will not testify
against their procurer unless there has been a quarrel, 46 and such a
quarrel or misunderstanding may be very temporary in terms of trial
dates. In prosecutions of this nature, it is well to have corroborative
evidence in addition to that of the prostitute. The statute, as a tool,
reaches the procurer and madam and, under proper conditions, is an
effective weapon. It is perfectly possible to reduce the present wordiness
of the statute without loss of any effectiveness.
The vagrancy statutes,4 7 properly used, are a broom to sweep the
streets clean of several types of undesirables, 48 including prostitutes.
People having no visible income lawfully acquired and who consort
with prostitutes, gamblers, etc., are by definition, vagrants and can be
punished as misdemeanants. Having been upheld on a constitutional
attack as an invalid exercise of the state's police power,49 the statute,
insofar as it is applicable to prostitution, applies to the street walker
"Va. Const. (1928) Art. I § 9, stating that "excessive bail ought not to be re-
quired." But See Art. VI, § iog, which provides that the General Assembly shall pro-
vide "by whom and in what manner, applications for bail shall be heard and de-
termined."
"Saunders v. Comm., 186 Va. iooo, 45 S. E. (2d) 307 (1947).
'"Secs. 63-338 to 63-341.
"Beggers, idlers, bootleggers, gamblers, etc.
4"Morgan v. Comm., 169 Va. 731, 191 S. E. 79, (1937).
[Vol. IX
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and prostitute frequenting the taverns. It is difficult to apply this
statute to the prostitute in league with a taxi-cab driver, or to an in-
mate in an established house, or to a casual visitor (for immoral pur-
poses) to a hotel. Dealing with the latter requires application of the
18-85 series mentioned above.
Departing briefly from the criminal law, the Virginia Code 5o de-
clares houses of prostitution to be nuisances and provides for their
abatement by injunction and for sale of all furniture and fixtures used
in conducting the nuisance for payment of costs incurred in the in-
junction proceedings. Any person violating such injunction shall be
punished for contempt and the penalties for contempt are fixed by
statute.5' This is a civil proceeding, but if synchronized with a prose-
cution of a prostitute or keeper of a house under the criminal statute,
a once prosperous, ornately-decorated house can become, literally, an
empty shell. This law has also survived a constitutional attack,5 2 the
Court of Appeals holding that the sale of movable property in a house
found to be a nuisance is not taking property without due process of
law. In passing, it should be noted that under this section, the attorney
for the Commonwealth may grant immunity from prosecution to any
witness called to testify on behalf of the Commonwealth. 53 In a dif-
ficult case, it makes available witnesses who otherwise might be re-
luctant to testify. Another aid to the confiscation proceeding is the
admissibility of evidence of the reputation of the place, as in the
criminal proceeding.
To modernize this staute, it might behoove the Legislature to
include automobiles and other forms of transportation used to conduct
prostitution in the property classification noted above, and permit
the confiscation and forfeiture of automobiles and household furni-
ture, etc., to the State under a procedure similar to that of the Al-
coholic Beverage Control Act and the gambling statutes.54 Prostitu-
tion today is just as dependent upon the automobile as are bootlegging
and gambling.
OSecs. 48-7 to 48-15.
'§ 48 -11 . $ioo to Siooo fine, or 3 to 6 months imprisonment, or both fine and
imprisonment.
rBunkley v. Comm., i3o Va. 55, io8 S. E. i (1921). Here the Court, in affirming
the lower court, indicated its views on the subject-matter by stating that Blanche
Bunkley (the defendant) "was an old hand in the detestable business of turning the
frailties of her own sex and the lust of men into pecuniary profit." 13o Va. 55, 63,
1o8 S. E. i, 4 (1921).
§48-15.
r Secs. 4-55 and 4-56.
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There are, finally, a group of laws not directly on the subject of
prostitution but which, depending upon the facts, may be used as
means of combating and neutralizing it. Such laws prohibiting adultery
and fornication, 55 lewd and lascivious cohabitation, 56 contributing to
the delinquency of a minor,57, second degree principals in statutory
rape,5s sale and possession of lewd literature, 59 abortion, 0 spreading
venereal disease6 ' and regulation of employment agencies62-all have
their place in controlling prostitution although the circumstances may
limit their use. Municipal ordinances sometimes parallel the state
code63 and may offer more flexibility in dealing with prostitution. In
areas adjoining military establishments, cooperation with the mili-
tary authorities and judicious use in declaring certain taverns and
other meeting places "off limits" to service personnel will cause the
owner to engage in hasty self-policing. Many other techniques may
be used, but as many as possible should be brought to bear at once.
From a tabulation made from questioning 16 local presecutors
from both urban and rural areas in Virginia, none professed know-
ledge of any organized prostitution; about half admitted there was
casual, infrequent prostitution, but that vagrancy laws with occasional
use of the Section 18-85 series were generally sufficient. In the urban
communities, the situation was in hand but required constant vigilance.
The street-walker, tavern pick-up was found to be more prevalent than
the organized house.
It was the general belief that prostitution laws are adequate. How-
ever, some revision could be made in the 18-85 series which would
clear up the confusion caused by the punishment sections. It is
recommended that an alternative jail or fine or both jail and fine
punishment be imposed to give the court more flexibility in imposing
punishment.
Permitting confiscation of automobiles and furniture and fixtures
would, it is believed, further deter people other than the actual pros-
1§18-82.
11§18-84.
1-§18-84. This would apply to both males and females under 18 years.
'§18-54. This applies to girls under 16 years. A charge of second-degree prin-
cipal, in statutory rape, could be used in a pandering case, where evidence of receiv-
ing money from a young girl's earnings is slight. The maximum and minimum
penalties for statutory rape are considerably higher than for pandering.
'§18-113.
10§18-68.
§2-99. Proof here may be very difficult.
2Secs. 40-15 and 40-19.
"See Code of City of Norfolk (1950) c. 29, which contains several ordinances
almost identical with the Code of Virginia.
[Vol. IX
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titute from engaging or participating in the activity. The pandering
statute could be made more concise. Finally, mandatory picture-taking
and finger printing for all people arrested for prostitution or on a re-
lated charge would be advisable. This would permit law enforcement
agencies to build their records of offenders so as to keep a better watch
upon them and also would be of assistance to the public health author-
ities in control of venereal disease.
Alcoholic Beverages
After the repeal of the i8th Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution, the people of Virginia, by majority vote in 1933, decided to
adopt a plan for the control of liquor. Years later the Supreme Court
of Appeals described the trepidation of the citizens in sizing up their
task: "The use of alcohol in its many forms has perplexed society and
its government from time immemorial and still does. It confronts them
with an inescapable problem and apparently with an insoluble one."
6 4
The Virginia Constitution of 1902 had provided: "The General As-
sembly shall have full power to enact local option or dispensary laws,
or any other laws controlling, regulating, or prohibiting the manu-
facture or sale of intoxicating liquors."6 5 That constitutional provis-
ion was the culmination of a number of uniform decisions of the
Supreme Court of Appeals, which decision was restated in 19o6, after
the Constitution of 1902 had been ratified. "The regulation of the
subject is completely within the police power of the state; that the
sale of liquor may be entirely prohibited, or regulated in any manner
the Legislature may deem wise, without supervision or control of the
courts."6  The Constitution was amended once, in 1928, and now reads:
"The General Assembly may enact laws controlling, regulating, or pro-
hibiting the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors." 67 With
this unlimited power, the General Assembly designated the Liquor
Control Committee to prepare appropriate legislation. That Commit-
tee agreed on five principles: (i) Temperance, social betterment and
respect for law should be the prime objectives of any system of liquor
control. (2) Local option is important, that is, the people in each com-
munity should decide whether they desire the sale of alcoholic bev-
erages in the locality. (3) The sale of alcoholic beverages should be
brought out in the open. (4) Taxes should be levied as a method of pro-
O'Comm. v. Anheuser-Busch, 81 Va. 678, 26 S. E. (2d) 94 (1943).
-Va. Const. (1902) §62.
c'HuIvey v. Roberts, io6 Va. 8.9, 192, 55 S. E. 585, 586 (19o6).
OWa. Const. (19o2) § 62.
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moting social control and not primarily for raising state or local rev-
enues. (5) The private profit motive, with its incentive to stimulate
the sale and and consumption of liquor, should be reduced to a mini-
mum. 68
With those principles in mind the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act of 193 4 was enacted.
9 The Supreme Court of Appeals has ob-
served that "The clear purpose of the Act is to permit the possession
of spirits and alcoholic beverages legally acquired, and to prohibit
and penalize possession when not so acquired." 70 That purpose is ef-
fected in the Act in two ways. First, the sale of beer and wine is per-
mitted by independent licensees. Secondly, the sale of distilled spirits
is conducted solely by the State in its own stores, which are established
for the purpose. Although the first category raises some problems for the
law enforcement officer, it is the second category which causes the most
concern.
The A.B.C. laws are concerned with regulating the manufacturer,
on the one hand, and the dispensing on the other, of alcoholic bev-
erages. With respect to beer and wine, it is not generally known that
beer and wine may be manufactured at one's residence for domestic
consumption at that residence, though not for sale.73 As a practical
matter, the process of producing wine and beer at home for illegal
sale is largely prohibitive because of the trouble and cost involved,
and because legal beer is plentiful. Law enforcement officers are seldom
confronted with this type of manufacturer, and it poses no problem
when detected.
However, the sale of beer and wine lawfully manufactured poses
more of a problem. The A.B.C. Act places the problem squarely in the
hands of the A.B.C. Board,72 and gives its regulations the force of law,
the violations of which are misdemeanors.7 3 The Board has equipped
itself with elaborate administrative machinery to see to it that those
applying for beer licenses are properly screened, and that those al-
ready licensed are carefully watched.
The law provides that beer and wine may be legally manufactured
or bottled for sale and may be sold in the State, providing the appro-
" Report of the Liquor Control Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 5 (1934). See, Proceed-
ure of the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (1944) 31 Va. Law Rev. 225,
241, for comment.
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priate license is procured.7 4 The suitability of any applicant for a
license is left entirely and exclusively to the A.B.C. Board, without
right of appeal,7 5 as is the power of the Board to revoke such licenses.7 6
Violations of the provisions of the A.B.C. Law and regulations, with
respect to beer and wine, are usually the administrative concern of
A.B.C. inspectors, and local law enforcement officers find few violations
which tend to corrupt the public morals.
The control of traffic in distilled spirits is the chief concern of
local officers, and the A.B.C. Act contains an intricate maze of sections
dealing in that subject. This portion of the article is necessarily limited
to a discussion of a few of those sections found most useful to enforce-
ment officers, as tools to effectuate the purpose of the entire Act. The
A.B.C. Act specifies that the manufacture (except beer and wine at
home, for home consumption) of alcoholic beverages, without proper
license of the A.B.C. Board, is a felony.77 To aid the enforcement of the
provisions, the statute declares that every person "found at"7 8 any
place where alcoholic beverages are being manufactured in violation of
the law, "shall be deemed prima facie guilty of manufacturing the
same or aiding and abetting in such manufacture and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished as if personally manufacturing the same." 7 9
Distilling apparatus and materials used in the illegal manufacture are
deemed contraband and subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth.8 0
With respect to the illegal dispensing of alcoholic beverages, the
statutes usually relied on are Section 4-58 and Section 4-81, Code of
Virginia. Section 4-58 makes it a misdemeanor, with a minimum jail
sentence of 3o days, for any person to sell any alcoholic beverages
"other than permitted by the provisions of this chapter."S' Except
for certain sales for medicinal purposes, the practical effect of the
statute is to forbid any sale of distilled beverages, since those beverages
are dispensed only by the A.B.C. stores. Enforcement of the statute is
aided by the statutory definition of "sale," which includes any trans-
action "otherwise than gratuitously."8 2 The statute is only as effective
in the control of whiskey traffic as the evidence which can be pro-
§4-11.
r§4-o5. At this writing, legislation is being pressed in the 1952 General Assembly
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duced to support the charge; and those who customarily purchase
whiskey illegally sold are not willing to admit the fact. Hence, law en-
forcement must resort to undercover tactics to detect the violators.
This section is probably used more than any other penal provision in
the A.B.C. Law, but because of its clear and simple intent, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals has had few occasions to pass upon it. The
handful of decided cases deal only with the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the convictions.8 3
Section 4-81 of the Code, commonly called the "nuisance section," is
one of the most effective devices of A. B. C. law controlling illegal
whiskey traffic. It specifies that "places of every description" are
deemed common nuisances "where alcoholic beverages are manufactur-
ed, stored, sold, dispensed, given away or used contrary to law, by any
scheme or device whatsoever ... "84 and "any person who maintains
or who aids and abets or knowingly is associated with others in main-
taining such common nuisance, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 85 The defi-
nition of the nuisance encompasses all the schemes known to bootleg-
gers, and the specification of who shall be guilty includes any person
shown to be knowingly associated with the illegal operation. The sec-
tion has been attacked on the constitutional ground that it is vague, un-
certain and indefinite in its terms, but the Supreme Court of Appeals
has not passed on the question.
86
The statute is particularly useful to the police when no specific
evidence of illegal sales or other unlawful use can be adduced. Never-
theless, it has been held that two distinct facts must be proved, "First,
that alcoholic beverages were habitually used upon the premises
contrary to law, and second, that the defendant maintained, aided,
abetted or knowingly was associated with another in such unlawful
use."87 The Court of Appeals, in reviewing these cases, has repeatedly
held that the question of whether or not the suspect place is a nuisance
8See Nicholas v. Comm., 186 Va. 979, 45 S. E. (2d) 302 (1947); Surrat v. Comm.,
187 Va. 940, 48 S. E. (2d) 362 (1948).
'§4-81.
'§4-81.
"Smith v. Comm., 171 Va. 480, 198 S. E. 432 (1938). There, the evidence of the
nuisance was so strong that the Court found it unnecessary to answer the consti-
tutional question.
'St. Clair v. Comm., 174 Va. 480, 482, 5 S. E. (2d) 512, 513 (1940) [italics supplied].
The "habitual" use of alcohol on the premises requires proof of a course of conduct,
over some yet-undefined period. The longest permissible period would seem to be
over a period of one year prior to the date of the arrest warrant, since that is the
misdemeanor statute of limitations. §19-3.
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is a question of fact for the jury under proper instruction.8 8 Circum-
stantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Section 4-81 also provides for the entry of a judgment that the
place the nuisance exists "be closed up" or, in the alternative, that the
owner or lessor give bond "conditioned that the premises shall not be
used for unlawful purposes .... " But it is important to note that to
invoke this portion of the statute, due notice must be given to the owner
or lessor, and guilty knowledge of either must be shown.89
No guilty knowledge need be proved as to the owner of the premises
under the injunction section.9°That section permits a temporary in-
junction against the nuisance as soon as the sworn bill is filed, which
injunction the Court may continue for an indefinite period, after the
cause has matured and been fully heard. Interviews of the Common-
wealth's Attorneys revealed that the section is widely used, both as a
penal measure against violators and as injunctive relief against the
premises.
Another interesting and useful statute, Section 4-75, makes it a
misdemeanor to possess, keep, or transport alcoholic beverages which
have been "illegally acquired."91 The enforcement of the section is
aided by the evidential statutory presumption that "spirits"92 in con-
tainers not bearing the A.B.C. seal "shall be deemed for the purposes of
this chapter to have been illegally acquired." 93 Those bootleggers who
traffic in illegally manufactured "corn" whiskey, or whiskey brought
in from neighboring non-control states, find the presumption hard to
overcome. Another paragraph declares that "alcoholic beverages" are
deemed to have been illegally acquired when found "in the possession
of any person in amounts in excess of one gallon, in containers not
Campbell v. Comm., 167 Va. 448, 187 S. E. 502 (1936); Smith v. Comm., 171 Va.
480, 198 S. E. 432 (1938); Woods v. Comm., 171 Va. 543, 199 S. E. 465 (1938); Dudley
v. Comm., 174 Va. 466, 5 S. E. (2d) 512 (1939); McCullough v. Comm., 182 Va. 26, 27
S. E. (2d) 904 (1943); Dodson v. Comm., 185 Va. 57, 87 S. E. (2d) 744 (1946). It is
interesting to note that the Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed the Campbell and
Dudley cases for insufficiency of evidence.
8§4-81. As originally enacted, the statute did not provide that notice and op-
portunity to be heard be given the owner of the premises. The "padlock" portion'
of the section was contested in McNelis v. Comm., 171 Va. 471, 198 S. E. 493 (1938)
and held to be unconstitutional in that it deprived the owner of his property with-
out due process of law. The notice provision was added by the 195o General Assem-
bly. Acts of Assembly (1950) c. 446, p. 877. It provides that notice and an opportuni-
ty to be heard must be afforded "any owner or-lessor not involved in the original
offenese." "Padlocking" is thus made more difficult, and properly so.
'0§4-82.
"§4-75-
12Spirits are defined in § 4-2 (24).
0§4-75.
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bearing stamps or other evidence showing the same to have been pur-
chased from the Board or a person licensed to sell the same under
the provisions of this chapter or other evidence that the tax due to
the Commonwealth or the markup required by the Board has been
paid . . ."94 It will be noted that "alcoholic beverages" by definition9 5
includes every conceivable form of "alcohol, spirits, wine or beer
and capable of being consumed." 96
The important elements of the offense are (i) the possession and
(2) the illegal acquisition. What constitutes "possession" has been the
subject of considerable case law. In 1938, the Court of Appeals observed
that the crime was unaccompanied by any statutory presumption "that
the person occupying or in control of the premises is in possession of
illegal liquor on the premises" 97 as had been the law prior to 1934.
"The fact of possession is a fact to be proved. It is not presumed."9 8
Thus, the Court ruled that the mere presence of liquor on the premises,
unaccompanied by other pertinent and material facts pointing
to the owner's possession, of itself is insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion.99 This construction of "possession" requires the police officer
to be sure of an offense, and operates as a safeguard for the innocent.
Similar opinions have been rendered as to the "transporting."
"The mere presence of a person in an automobile in which intoxi-
cating liquor, illegally acquired, is being transported, is not conclusive
proof of illegal possession or illegal transportation."' 00
With respect to the "illegal acquisition," it seems that as far as
the consumer is concerned, one of the main purposes of the A. B. C.
Law is to prescribe how alcoholic beverages may be lawfully possessed
and, necessarily, how they may be lawfully acquired.1° 1 The Court of
Appeals has quickly noted, however, "that the Act, nowhere, in express
terms provides that it shall be unlawful to possess spirits or alcoholic
1§4-75-
0§4-2(2). "'Alcoholic beverages' shall include the four varieties of liquor de-
fined herein as alcohol, spirits, wine and beer, and any one or more of such varieties,
and every liquid or solid, patented or not, containing alcohol, spirits, wine or beer
and capable of being consumed by a human being."
S14-2(2).
"rSutherland v. Comm., 171 Va. 485, 491, 198 S. E. 452, 456 (1938)."'Sutheland v. Comm., 171 Va- 485, 491, 198 S. E. 452, 455 (1939)-
'0Later decisions reaffirm the Sutherland case: Fairfax v. Comm., 177 Va. 824 ,
13 S. E. (2d) 315 (1941); Saunders v. Comm., 178 Va. ioo, 16 S. E. (2d) 383 (1941);
Powers v. Comm., 182 Va. 669, 3o S. E. (2d) 22 (1944); Pardue v. Comm., 183 Va. 277,
32 S. E. (2d) 77 (944).
"Johnson v. Comm., 168 Va. 685, 686, 19o S. E. 328, 329 (1937). See Worsham v.
Comm., 184 Va. 192, 34 S. E. (2d) 234 (1945).
mSee Miller v. Comm., 172 Va. 639, 2 S. E. (2d) 343 (1939).
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beverages in containers not bearing the required government stamps or
seals."'102 This immediately points up the vital importance to law en-
forcement officers of the two evidential presumptions noted above, for
it makes the absence of the stamps or seals on the containers in question
the test to be applied to determine the legality of the source from which
or the means by which the beverages were acquired.
Since the Act does not make possession in unstamped containers
an offense, this section would seem, on first glance, to be rather arbi-
trary. However, the evidential presumptions have been held to be not
conclusive, but merely presumptions "subject to be rebutted by evi-
dence of opposing or explanatory facts."'103 The section is one of the
most useful to effectuate the intent of the A. B. C. Act.
Section 4-72 is closely related to Section 4-75. Section 4-72 makes
unlawful the transportation of alcoholic beverages in quantities in
excess of one gallon, "within, into or through this State .. ." except
by a permit issued by the A. B. C. Board. The section was designed
"to protect citizens of Virginia from the illicit delivery, sale, and trans-
portation of ardent spirits."'' 04 It is aimed primarily at the professional
runner of whiskey, who deals in large amounts, and it may be presumed
that the Legislature felt that one gallon would be a sufficient supply for
the ordinary domestic user. The Supreme Court of Appeals has held
that "transportation" means exactly that, and it will not infer from the
evidence that the vehicle must have moved at one time or another,
in the absence of circumstances which show that to have occurred. 05
However, Section 4-75, noted above, picks up the offense when the
"transporting" evidence leaves off, but only if illegal acquisition can
be proved. For instance, if two gallons of stamped whiskey were found
in a parked car, the Commonwealth would be required to prove that
the same was illegally acquired and that the defendant was in fact
in possession.
Another effective tool available to the law enforcement officer
is the confiscation provision of the A. B. C. Act. The provision is
10Miller v. Comm., 172 Va. 639, 647, 2 S. E. (2d) 343, 347 ('939). On the con-
trary, the Court observes: "In the possession and use of legally acquired liquor,
[the consumer] is not denied the privilege to mix spirits or alcoholic beverages in
cocktail shakers or in eggnog bowls, or to transfer it from a larger or broken bottle
to an unstamped container, or to transport it in a flask, or, perhaps, to carry a small
quantity, in an unstamped container, to the bedside of a sick neighbor."
"wMiller v. Comm., 172 Va. 639, 647, 2 S. E. (2d) 343, 345 (1939).
'"Dickerson v. Comm., x81 Va. 313, 325, 24 S. E. (2d) 550, 556 (1943). See also
Patterson v. Comm., 187 Va. 14, 52 S. E. (2d) 89 (1949).
2Newman v. Comm., 187 Va. 803, 48 S. E. (2d) 355 (1948).
1952]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
particularly painful to the bootlegger whose business requires that he
deliver whiskey directly to the customer. Section 4-56 requires an
officer to search a vehicle suspected of the illegal transporting of alcohol-
ic beverages or the transporting of such beverages illegally acquired,
"and if such illegally acquired alcoholic beverages or alcoholic beverages
being illegally transported in amounts in excess of one quart be found
therein, he shall seize the same ... "106 The statute then sets out an
elaborate procedure whereby the vehicle may be forfeited to the
State. An information is filed, setting forth the grounds of the proposed
forfeiture and praying that the vehicle be condemned. The proceeding
has been held to be one purely in rem, 107 and the statute provides that
appropriate notice be given to the owner, persons indebted for the
purchase of the vehicle, and persons having liens thereon.108 Those
interested persons may answer the information and defend their in-
terests. For the owner to have the vehicle relieved from forfeiture, he
must prove that he was the bona fide owner at the time of the seizure,
that he was ignorant of the illegal use of the vehicle complained of, that
the illegal use was without his connivance or consent, express or im-
plied, and that he has perfected his title to the vehicle. Similarly, the
lien holder must prove that the title was perfected by the owner, that
the lienor was "ignorant of the fact that such . . . vehicle was being
used for illegal purposes, when it was so seized," 109 that the use was
without his connivance or consent, and that his lien was bona fide and
perfected according to law. It will be seen at once that these require-
ments are eminently fair to an owner or lienor wholly innocent of the
illegal transporting; yet they are stern requirements for the most clever
bootlegger to overcome. "The burden of proof is upon the claimant.
Forfeiture is the rule and release therefrom is the exception." 110 It has
been held that the reputation of the owner-claimant is admissible to
show his knowledge of the illegal use, even though he was not present
at the time of the seizure."' This is a latitude not permitted to the
"§4-56(a).
"'-Ives v. Comm., 182 Va. 17, 27 S. E. (2d) 9o6 (1943).
"'8"Personal service of the notice is not necessary to the validity of a proceeding
in rem." Ives v. Comm., 182 Va. 17, 22, 27 S. E. (2d) 906, 9o8 (1943), citing Landers v.
Comm., 126 Va. 780, 101 S. E. 788 (1919).
lw§4-56(i).
2"Bandy v. Comm., 185 Va. 1044, 1052, 41 S. E. (2d) 71, 74 (1947). This burden
is one of "reasonable proof." Patterson v. Comm., 187 Va. 913, 921, 48 S. E. (2d) 357,
361 (1948). See also Cleek v. Comm., 189 Va. 14, 52 S. E. (2d) 89 (1949); Wray v.
Comm., 191 Va. 738, 62 S. E. (2d) 889 (1951).
"'Wray v. Comm., 191 Va. 738, 62 S. E. (2d) 889 (1951). There, the evidence
revealed that the owner had a bootlegging reputation and was a friend of those in
the car when seized, who were also reputed bootleggers.
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Commonwealth in the prosecution of criminal offenses under the Act,
and its effect is a substantial obstacle for the not-so-pure claimant
to overcome. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth, to sustain the'forfeiture,
must produce sufficient evidence against the claimants, for "where the
testimony of the defendant in no wise conflicts with the testimony of
the Commonwealth and is not contradicted directly or indirectly, the
testimony of the defendant must be accepted as true."'1 1
2
The interview with attorneys for the Commonwealth reveals that
the confiscation statute is widely, though not universally, used through-
out the State, both in urban and rural communities. It is one of the
most effective weapons of harrassment in the A. B. C. Act, for it places
on the bootlegger the perplexing problem of transporting his com-
modity undetected. In addition, confiscation of vehicles serves to
take the profit out of bootlegging. The statute could be strengthened,
however, by including (in addition to vehicles illegally transporting
beverages or transporting beverages illegally acquired) vehicles "being
used in connection with a sale of alcoholic beverages in violation of
the A. B. C. Act." That addition would subject to forfeiture those
vehicles used to deliver whiskey for illegal sale, in amounts less than
one quart. It appears that the confiscation statute was designed pri-
marily for large-scale runners of whiskey and, thus far, the "pint-
pushers""13 have escaped its effects.
In conclusion, a potent law enforcement tool is Section 4-91, which
specifies that in any charge of violating the A. B. C. Act, it may be al-
leged and proven that the defendant has previously been convicted of
violating the Act. The purpose for which those prior convictions may
be shown has been limited by the Court of Appeals to the enhance-
ment of the punishment, in the event the defendant is first found guilty
of the pending charge.114 They may be proved by the defendant's own
admissions on the stand,"15 but it is customary to introduce oral testi-
mony of officers who took part in the prior arrests.
'"Patterson v. Comm., 187 Va. 913, 48 S. E. (2d) 357 (1948). There, the defendant's
auto was seized in his absence at a gas station where he had parked it. It contained
eighty-five fifths of Washington, D. C. whiskey. He testified that he had left it to be
serviced, had given no one permission to use it or to store whiskey in it, and that he
did not know how it got there. None of the Commonwealth's evidence was to the
contrary. The judgment of forfeiture was reversed.
m"Pint-Pusher" is a descriptive term used by vice officers to designate those
bootleggers who deliver whiskey by the pint to forgetful or miscalculating customers,
after the State whiskey stores have closed for the day.
nSmith v. Comm., 182 Va. 585, 30 S. E. (2d) 26 (1944); Campbell v. Comm., 176
Va. 564, 11 S. E. (2d) 577 (1940).
215Smith v. Comm., 182 Va. 585, 30 S. E. (2d) 26 (1944).
.1952]
20 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The constitutionality of the section has been upheld as not de-
priving the defendant of equal protection and due process. 116 How-
ever, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the purpose for
which the jury may consider the evidence.
As a practical matter, the prior convictions may some times work
a hardship on the defendant. In a close case, where the burden of
proof has barely been met by the Commonwealth, evidence of the
prior convictions might serve to dispel any reasonable doubt from
the jurors' minds as to the defendant's guilt. Human nature being what
it is, this is true even though the jury is carefully instructed and defense
counsel vigorously argue the purpose for which the evidence may be
received.
It is suggested that an amendment be made to the procedure,
whereby the jury would not be informed of the prior convictions until
they had passed on the guilt or innocence in the pending charge. In
such a procedure, the jury would be instructed to return their verdict
without specifying the penalty. If the verdict were that of guilty, it
would then be permissible for the Commonwealth to allege and prove
prior convictions, after which the jury could retire to fix the punish-
ment. Even though such a procedure would logically require two sets
of instructions and two summation periods for counsel, it is submitted
that the possibility of the jury's considering the prior convictions as
evidence in the instant case would be eliminated.
Gambling
Since earliest times there have been laws prohibiting and limiting
gambling in Virginia." 7 Today no form of gambling is permissible, and
all individuals in any way connected with it are subject to punish-
ment; and our courts follow a broad statutory interpretation. The legis-
lative and judicial attitude toward gambling is well illustrated by the
following preamble to a statute passed by the General Assembly in 1792:
Sec. V "And to prevent gaming at ordinaries and other public
places, which must be often attended with quarrels, disputes and
controversies, the impoverishment of many people and their fam-
ilies, and the ruin of health, and corruption of the manners of
youth, who upon such occasions frequently fall in company with
lewd and dissolute persons, who have no other way of maintain-
ing themselves but by gaming; Be it further enacted...."118
2a6Surratt v. Comm., 187 Va. 940, 48 S. E. (2d) 362 (1948).
"'The first statute on gaming was passed in 1727. 4 Hen Stat. 214. The Act of
1740 contained the first criminal section on the subject. 5 Hen Stat. 102, §4-
"'Va. Code of 1802, c. 96, p. 174. This part of the code reduced all previous laws
[Vol: IX
VIRGINIA RACKET CONTROL LAWS
Today the Constitution of Virginia"1 9 removes from the Legisla-
ture the power to enact any law making lotteries legal, by flatly de-
claring that all activity of lotteries shall be prohibited and that none
shall be authorized. Where the statutes leave any question concerning
an activity faintly considered to be a lottery or gambling, this provision
is sufficient to indicate the policy of the Commonwealth and to act as
a guiding beacon for the Court of Appeals. In order to remove any
doubt, the Virginia Code at Section 18-276 provides that all laws for
suppressing gaming and lotteries shall be construed as remedial.
A survey of Title 18, Chap. 9, Arts. 1-2 of the Code of Virginia 20
discloses at once a series of statutes which afford complete coverage in
the gambling field. With the help of the above-mentioned constitution-
al provision and the statute declaring these laws to be remedial, it
would seem that the law enforcement officer has no legal problem, and,
if any problem at all, it is one of merely enforcement. The main thesis
of the Kefauver Committee's report is to the effect that gambling
syndicates having become organized on a nation-wide basis, with rapid
means of communication, the average state's laws can only strike
at the local offenders and cannot reach the behind-the-scenes figures
who control the vast networks.' 2' That Committee believes, however,
that a combination of federal legislation regulating and prohibiting
interstate communication of gambling information and steady police
pressure on local outlets with the use of existing state laws will pro-
duce the most effective control of gambling.
If this be true, it is submitted that the Virginia law is more than
adequate to contribute its share to the effort, and perhaps of foremost
importance is Section 18-282,122 aimed at prohibiting the betting and
transmitting of bets on horse races outside the state's boundaries.
Section 18-281 strikes generally at "making books, pools or mutuals
upon the result of any game of baseball or football or any trial of
speed or power of endurance of animals or beasts .... -123
Ilustrative of the State's clear-cut policy to forbid gaming of every
other sort is Section 18-284, Code of Virginia, and related sections. The
against gaming to one single act. Gambling debts were voided, gamblers and keepers
of gaming devices deemed vagrants, and gaming devices made subject to forfei-
ture.
2=Va. Const. (19o2) §60.
10§18-278 to 18-3o.
"Final Report of Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Inter-
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section is the nemesis of every civic and church organization attempting
to stage a carnival or the like (usually to raise money for purposes
universally conceded to be worthwhile). Those who operate amuse-
ment parks as a business are more wary of its prohibition. "If any per-
son keep or exhibit, for the purpose of gaming, any table or bank of
any name or description whatever, or any bank used for gaming which
has no name, and any wheel of fortune or slot-machine, or any pigeon-
hole table or Jennie Lynn table, whether the game or table be played
with cards, dice, or otherwise, or be a partner or concerned in interest
in the keeping or exhibiting such table or bank, he shall be confined in
jail .... '124 This eliminates the playing lawfully of any such game,
where consideration is passed for the privilege.
At one time, in 1920, the Legislature added a proviso to the section
making it lawful to keep games and wheels on such amusement parks
and carnivals, where the prizes consisted of candy or novelties. 25 The
reason such an inroad was permitted might have been due, in part, to
the casual language used by the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1911, in
Virginia State Fair Association v. Virginia Amusement Concessions
Corp.1-26 There, on a contract between the parties, it became material
to compare the legality of upright wheels of fortune where money was
the prize and other wheels where only novelties could be won. The
Court said:
"It is obvious that there was no such relation between a wheel
at which money was exchanged for money, which was contrary
to law, and a wheel at which some innocent trifle was given in
exchange as that the one could not be operated without the
other."1
27
This is the extent of case law on the subject in Virginia. Perhaps the
Court was indeed drawing a distinction between the two wheels, as
other states have done. 28 Even so, it is submitted that the statute then
'1§18-284.
'-Acts of Assembly (1920) c. 409, p. 597. It read: "Provided, however, that nothing
contained herein shall prevent any person from keeping or exhibiting any game or
wheel upon any city, county, or state fair grounds, benevolent bazaars, carnivals and
amusement parks, whereby prizes consist of fruit, candy, toys or other novelties."
12616 Va. 547, 82 S. E. 176 (1911).
=11s6 Va. 547, 56o, 82 S. E. 176, s8o (1911).
'SThe words "game" and "gaming," as used in antigambling statutes, are used
in the narrow sense of something vicious, and almost invaribly in connection with
betting, rather than in the broad sense of a sport or pasttime in which people may
engage without any thought of betting. The courts in their interpretation of such
statutes have been careful to draw a distinction between illegal gaming and innocent
playing of games, even for a prize." [Italics supplied] 24 Am. Jur., Games and Acts
Prohibited. §g.
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did not permit such a construction. Nor does it now, for the present
law is the same as it existed in 1911, the proviso of 192o having been
eliminated in 1924.129 One indication of the present Court's feeling is
the recent denial of a writ of error to a defendant convicted of keeping
a wheel of fortune where dolls only were prizes. The Virginia State
Fair case only'3 0 was urged as authority for reversal, but to no avail.18 1
Section 18-287 is aimed at the player, rather than the keeper of the
game, and makes it unlawful to play the games mentioned above and,
in addition, to bet in any game in a public place. As to the latter part,
it is not necessary to prove that any money or other articles of value was
bet at the game. 132 Thus, every citizen who matches coins for drinks
at the corner drug store is within the spectre of the gaming law.183 The
law seems dearly antiquated, and the fact that the strictest enforce-
ment has not been attempted is a matter of common knowledge, the
best evidence of this being that neither Section 18-287 nor it prede-
cessor statutes have been construed since 18581134
As if the law were not clear enough, the present Section 18-278 was
enacted in 1916, providing that "it shall be unlawful for any person
to bet, wager, or play at any game for money."'1 5 The simple yet abso-
lute prohibition would seem to be the most adequate statutory tool
available to law enforcement officers. Yet, the statute has never been
construed by the Court of Appeals.
Sections 18-290 through 18-296 are effective weapons against punch
boards, slot machines and similar devices. Section 18-290 forbids the
keeping or exhibiting for use, or permitting the same, of those devises
which operate on the nickel-in-the-slot principle, "in the operation
'Acts of Assembly (1924) p. 414.
""See note 3, supra.
mComm. v. Smith, Corp. Court, Part Two, City of Norfolk; writ denied Dec.
6, 1951.
11§18-289. Bowling, chess, backgammon, drafts, dominoes, and "licensed games"
are exempt.
mIn the ancient case of Comm. v. Terry, 2 Va. Cas. (4 Va.) 77 (1817), the Court
rendered this terse per curiam opinion: "The Court is of opinion, that the act of
playing Cards in a Tavern, whether the person so playing bets or not, is Gaming,
within the true intent and meaning of the several Laws made to prevent unlawful
Gaming, and that Judgment ought to be rendered on the verdict in this Case."
'-"Purcell v. Comm., 14 Gratt. (55 Va.) 679 (1858). Related sections are aimed at
the occupant of premises where gaming is permitted (§18-285) and at doorkeepers and
guards of such places (§18-286).
mActs of Assembly (1916) c. 44, P. 50. The act now states: "Any person who shall
bet, wager, or play at any game for money or other thing of value shall be fined not
exceeding one hunded dollars, or confined in jail not exceeding sixty days, or both."
[Italics supplied].
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of which any element of chance whatever may enter .... 36 Devices
which do not uniformly return to the customer in each transaction the
equivalent in merchandise that it returned in each preceding trans-
action are deemed to embody the "element of chance."' 37 Also, an im-
portant statutory presumption accompanies the prohibition: "The
possession of any such punch board, slot machine or other device
shall be prima facie evidence of the use thereof."'
3 8
Sections 18-291 through 18-294 deal exclusively with slot machines,
the first section overlapping in most instances the prohibitions of
Section 18-29o. The series was passed in a single act in 1936.139 As
originally enacted, it prohibited the keeping or use of any slot machine
by any person, except "a duly licensed dealer in slot machines storing
such machines for sale outside this State and in jurisdictions where the
operation of such machines is not forbidden by law .... "140 In the
extra session of the Legislature in 1944-45, the portion of the statute
quoted above was eliminated, 14' making the prohibition absolute
and without exception. Its provisions are phrased in the strongest and
most minute language, and include a lengthy definition of slot ma-
chine.142 Any article used in violation of Section 18-291 is declared
a "public nuisance"'343 and subject to forfeiture. In 1942 the Legisla-
ture added two additional sections to the statute,144 the first aimed at
lax enforcement of the slot machine law in the localities. It provides
that, if it shall come to the Governor's attention that the law is not
being enforced, he may call on the Attorney General to instruct local
officers "to take such steps as nmay be necessary to insure the enforcement
of such sections .... ,145 The second addition makes it mandatory on
the A. B. C. Board to suspend or revoke the wine and beer license of any
licensee violating or permitting the violation of this slot machine
law.' 46 This series of sections is a most stringent condemnation of its
particular subject matter.
For sheer inclusiveness, the statute prohibiting lotteries is un-





"Acts of Assembly (1936) C. 247, p. 397.
'1Acts of Assembly (1936) C. 247, P. 397.
""Acts ot Assembly (1945) c. 86, p. 83.
"'2§18-292.
"'§18-294.
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sentence and fine, the statute is also aided by the constitutional pro-
hibition14s previously mentioned. However, it is to be noted that
"Lottery" itself is not defined. This is of little comfort to the law
breaker because, falling back on case law, the Court of Appeals has
held a lottery to consist of three elements: (i) the distribution of money
or property (2)by chance (3) for a valuable consideration paid, or
agreed to be paid.149 Most jurisdictions are in accord with this propo-
sition. 5 0
The first element of a lottery seldom causes any difficulty; the other
two on occasion may require more reflection. Generally, the only issue
for decision arising from the second element, chance, is whether or not
the scheme involves any element of skill. When a "commercial"
scheme' 51 (as opposed to an out-and-out policy game)is proposed and
the element of skill is added to escape infraction of the lottery law, the
scheme loses its mass appeal, since'most people prefer a scheme where
selection of the winner is by pure chance. Thus, the question of what
is or is not consideration has been the subject of much litigation in many
jurisdictions. 152 The Supreme Court of Appeals, following other courts,
has given a broad interpretation to "consideration" by holding that at-
tendance alone at an auction sale, regardless of whether a person made
a purchase or not, is consideration. A prize given away to a lucky ticket
holder at such sale, completed the lottery.153 Thus, give-away, raffles,
door prizes, as well as the policy or numbers games are illegal schemes,
subject to jail and fine.
Section 18-3O1 with its five sub-sections covers all the phases of
lottery participation- even to the extent of possession of tickets for
the purpose of sale or transfer. This provision is aimed at the "writer"' 54
and the "pick-up" man 55 in the numbers game. The Supreme Court
of Appeals has had no difficulty in deciding that "numbers"'1 6 and
"baseball" pools157 are lotteries within the meaning of Section 18-3o1.
""5Va. Const. (19o2) §60.
"1'Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 292 (1931).
4For annotation see Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1lO9 and subsequent annotations
covering all types of commercial enterprises.
151A scheme for attracting attention to an otherwise reputable business establish-
mement.
'-Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. iiog. For example, movie bank nights so prevelant in
the 1930's were the subject of considerable case law in the United States.
2'Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 292 (1931).
214The individual who meets the person actually making the wager.
"-The individual collecting the bets from the writers who in turn gives the tickets
to the backer of the policy game.
"Motley v. Comm., 177 Va. 8o6, 14 S. E. (2d) 28 (1940).
"'Rosenberg v. Comm., 165 Va. 73, 181 S. E. 368 (1935).
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The only "commercial" scheme known to be considered' 58 was held to
be a lottery, although the case was not heard as a criminal matter. It
seems that the merchant would be best advised, under the existing
law, to avoid any kind of give-away schemes.
Not only can an individual be incarcerated for participation in a
lottery, however slight, but, under Section 18-3o2, the forfeiture statute,
provides that all money, prizes, office equipment, or any personal prop-
erty used in connection with a lottery, may be forfeited. There is a
recently-added proviso,159 however, which protects the innocent lienor
of such seized property, provided the lien is perfected. 160 The enforce-
ment of lottery forfeitures follows generally' 61 the forfeiture procedure
set for violations of the state game and fish laws.
62
As in the A. B. C. cases, this section subjects to forfeiture the auto-
mobile used in the illegal game. Use of automobiles for collecting
"numbers" in a policy game is widespread, particularly where the area
covered by such a game is large. Apprehension of a "pick-up" man
in an automobile with slips in his possession will generally be sufficient
for both consfication of the vehicle and his conviction for violating
the criminal law. Logically, it follows that bicycles, taxicabs, and
even public buses could also be confiscated, provided, of course, that the
drivers were aware of the occupation and immediate business of the
"pick-up" man. If a numbers game can be confined to an area no
larger than one can travel by foot, it is a major victory for law en-
forcement, by virtue of containment alone.
Section 18-303 permits the local prosecutor or the Attorney-General
to enjoin any person gambling or conducting a lottery, and it is pro-
vided that the procedure in such a chancery suit shall be the same
as in any injunction suit.
Finally, it should be noted that prosecution witnesses in gaming
cases are exempt from prosecution and can be compelled to testify.
163
rsMaughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 292 (193).
e'Acts of Assembly (1950) c. 262, p. 455.
"'In effect giving the innocent lienor the same rights as that of an innocent
lienor of a car seized for illegal transportation of whiskey. See §4-56 (i), at note lo9,
supra.
"'Except automobiles, for which the procedure is the same as in A.B.C. for-
feitures. §4-56.
"'See §29-214 et seq. See Boggs v. Comm., 76 Va. 989 (1882), an interesting early
case providing that ignorance of an owner as to the use of his vessel was no defense
to forfeiture proceedings. All property, including automobiles, were proceeded
against under these code provisions until the 195o Amendment, note 159, supra,
which provided for the relief of innocent automobile lienors.
"'§19-240.
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Such a provision can be of great assistance in dealing with a reluct-
ant witness.
With the minute statutory coverage afforded gambling in Vir-
ginia, little else could be done to strengthen the law. However, it would
seem that some of the mandatory jail sentences should be changed to
an alternative sentence-jail or fine, or both jail and fine-depending
upon the facts. This would relieve reluctant juries of the problem of
either acquiting or sentencing to jail business people who violate the
law prohibiting lotteries by an advertising scheme, and the occasional
bettor in the drugstore or tavern. A fine generally is sufficient in such
cases, and the jail sentence would still be available for the professional
gambler and lottery operator.
Conclusion
This article has addressed itself exclusively to an examination of the
adequacy of the racket-control laws of Virginia, as tools of enforcement
in that area of crime. The abundance of case law referred to is best
evidence that the State is not free from vice. The attorneys for the
Commonwealth are constantly faced with the problems of new schemes
attempted by the underworld in an effort to avoid the letter of the
vice laws. Even so, they report that there is very little organized book-
making in the State, although the "numbers" game flourishes in wide
areas, but on a local scale. Prostitution customarily encountered is on
a small scale, usually in isolated instances. Bootlegging in its different
forms obtains uniformly throughout the State but has yet to reach
uncontrollable proportions.
This being the case, a great majority of the attorneys interviewed be-
lieved the State need not follow the Kefauver Committee's recommen-
dation that a special racket squad be formed in the State. Nor do they
believe it necessary for the State to make a sweeping investigation of
crime within its borders. Furthermore, they uniformly believe that
the racket-control laws are adequate to meet the problem in Virginia.
Even though it appears that the Commonwealth has not yet suffered
from the onslaught of nation-wide syndicates of vice, it is submitted that
the existence of any vice in the State is an invitation to more. Every
community is subject to become the prey of gangsterism, directly or in-
directly.
"In many cities, large and small, there is eviderice of active and
often controlling participation by former bootleggers, gangsters
and hoodlums, in the political affairs of the community. In some
cases this participation extends to other cities and even to the
government of the State. Underworld characters do not engage
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in politics for the good of the community or the Nation. They do
so for the purpose of increasing their power and wealth and gain-
ing greater protection for their illegal activities." 10 4
And the Kefauver Committee gives this warning:
"In many cities, large and small, visited by the committee,
corrupt officials have been forced to resign, grand juries and law
enforcement officials have doubled their vigiliance, and gangsters
have gone into hiding. Even Virginia and the District of Colum-
bia which were not themselves the subject of investigation, have
felt the repercussions of the committee's work...."165
Hence, it is submitted that the continued pressure of law enforce-
ment on the local level, and constant vigilance to detect the advent of
large-scale vice, are the keystones to keeping the Commonwealth free
of the rackets. For this endeavor, it is finally submitted, the laws of the
State are basically adequate and will continue to serve as tools for law
enforcement officials.
6'-Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in
Interstate Commerce, Sen. Rep. No. 725, P-5.
"'Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in
Interstate Commerce, Sen. Rep. No. 725, p. I.
